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182 EICHELBERGER V. CITY OF BERKELEY C.2d 
'l'he salaries paid district and public defenders 
are not a proper measure for the compensation 
allowable to attorneys appointed to defend those charged with 
erime. \Vith sueh positions go prestige and a certain steady 
income which may in a measure account for the differcnee 
between it and the cost of handling the legal work on a piece 
basis. These offieiais have no overhead expense as do attorneys 
engaged in private practice and all expenses illcurred by sueh 
offieials in the investigation and handling of criminal cases 
are paid out of public fuu<l:-:. Moreover, it is a matter of 
comrnon knowledge that the salaries of' govc~rnment officers do 
not match what they woul(l receive for similar work in private 
activities whether it be legal or administrative work. 
I would issue the writ on the ground that the court abused 
its discretion although I believe the order is appealable. It is 
not an order made after judgment substantially affecting the 
judgment but is a final order in a special civil procePding 
which is made appealable b~· section 963, subdivision 1, of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Schaner, .J., concurred. 
[S. F. No. 19100. In Bank. Feb. 10, 1956.] 
GEORGE G. EICHELBERGER et aL, Appellants, v. CITY 
OF BERKEI.~EY et al., Respondents. 
LEWIS WESCO'l'T, Appellant, v. CI'l'Y OF BERKELEY 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Pensions-Amount.-Where a pension statute states that the 
pension shall be a pcrePntage of the average salary attached 
to the rank held by the employee before retirement, it is con-
strued as providing for a fluctuating pension which increases 
or decreases as the salnrirs paid to active employees increase 
or decrease. 
[2] Municipal Corporations-Fire Department-Pensions.--Where 
a city ordinnnee expressly provides that pensions to retired 
firemPn shall not fluetunte np or down in accordance with pay 
Jluctuations of aeti ve firemen, reti rl'd firemen are not en-
[1] SP(; Cal.Jur., Pensions, ~ 6; Am.Jur., J>Pnsions, ~~ 32, 33. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pensions,~ 8; :1) ::\lunicipal Cor-
porations, § 324(5). 
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reason of any pay 
ordinance is snb~ 
the word "increase" and to 
"shall not decrease 
amendment carries the im~ 
be increased in accordance 
with the fluctuation in pay of active firemen and indicates 
that the ordinance was intended to apply to existing pen-
in view of the rule~ that pension laws must 
"'"'"'·'"''"" to achieve their beneficent purposes. 
Id.-Fire Department-Pensions.-Where a city ordinance is 
amended to authorize inereases in pensions to retired firemen 
the basis. of increases to aetive firemen, application 
the amendment to existing pensioners from its effective date 
not retroactive inasmuch as pension payments are a eon-
obligation and the ordinance is being applied only to 
thereafter payable. (Disapproving Jordan v. Re-
tirement Board, 35 Cal.App.2d 653, 96 P.2d 973, and Holmberg 
Oakland, 55 CalApp. 270, 203 P. 167.) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
County. CeeillYiosbaeher, Judge. Reversed with diree-
Actions to recover amounts allegedly accrued as payments 
from pensions and death benefits, and for declaratory 
Judgment for defendants reversed with directions. 
Cornish & Cornish, Francis T. Cornish and Howard W. 
for Appellants. 
C. Hutchinson and Robert T. Anderson for Re-
CARTER, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment for de-
lei.tuauL, city of Berkeley, in consolidated actions by plaintiffs 
to recover amounts allegedly accrued as payments due from 
nensJ'on.s. and in some cases, death benefits, alleged to be pay-
defendant, and for declaratory relief. 
!<uuLJ:lli:S Eichelberger and Wescott, here appealing, retired 
ner•;ur1e entitled to pensions after long service as firemen 
by defendant. Their retirement commenced on July 
and February 25, 1939, respectively. Plaintiff Elsie 
also appealing, is entitled to a pension as widow 
Haggerty who died on August 18, 1938, in the line 
ErcnELDEIWEH v. CrTY OI" BimKELEY C.2d 
of 
dPf't•ndant. 
serv1ce as a flreman in the employ of 
Defendant number 2188-N 
J 9:18. It authorized retirement and 
members of fi1·e who had theretofore served or 
should tlH'rt'aftrr fWtTO for a number of y0ars. l<.,or 
those the vvas to be "one half of the average 
attaehet1 to the rank or ranks held the three 
.nan; the date of retirement.'' In the 
(·ase of the >vidow of a fireman, killed in line of duty, the 
percentage was to be one third. Section 24 of that ordinance 
read: "The pensions granted under the terms of this ordi-
uaw•e shall not 1'ncrease nor decrease with any changes in 
snbsr•quent to the date of the granting of the pension 
for the rallk or ranlm npon which the pension vms based, nor 
shall any changes of title or rank in the active service effect 
an increase or reduction in the existing pensions." (Italics 
ours.) Effeetiye April20, 1939, defendant adopted Ordinanee 
Number 2254-N.S. amending Ordinance Number 2188-N.S., 
supra. One eha11ge here pertinent was in section 24, supra. 
'!'he amendment eliminated the ·words italicized in tile above 
qnot ation of section 24 in its original form.* 
']'here haye been salary inerrases in thr positions formerly 
held by Haggerty sinee his death and by plaintiffs Eiehel-
berger and \Vescott sinee their retirement and plaintiffs elaim 
that they are entitled to haye their pensions inereaserl aecord-
ingly. 'rhey claim that under the original 1938 ordinanee 
(2188-N.S.) they are so entitled and if not they are entitled 
to inereased pensions because of the increase in firemen's pay 
since the 1939 amendment. (2144-N.S.) Defendant elaims 
that section 24, s11pra, of the 1938 ordinanee exelnded a pen-
sion 1vhieh would fluetnate up or down aeeording to the pay of 
firemen, and to apply the 1939 amendment to plaintiffs, ·who 
.,.Tn 1!144 Onlinanee Number 2188·N.S. was again amended. It was 
recited that it was the intention of the eitv council that by that ordi-
nance there wn s to l1e ''a fixed amount, whiJh 1\·ould neither increase nor 
deerease'' and clrrrifie;Jtion was necessary, hence section 24 was amended 
to read: ''Tho TlCnsionR granted under the terms of this ordinance 
shall he based upon the nverage monthly rate of salary which sueh 
members shrrll han) rereiYcd during the three years immediately pre· 
ceding the date of retirement, and shall be for a fixed amount that shall 
not inerease nor decrc>1se, regardless of any change in salary subsequent 
to the date of grnnting of the pensions for the rank or ranks that the 
members held prior to tbe granting of the pensions." It was held in 
Terry v. City of 41 Cal.2d G98 [263 P.2d 833], that that 
amendment could not persons who, lil'e plaintiffs, retired before 
it became effective. 
OF BErtKEJ,EY 
[46 C.2d 182; 293 P.2d ll 
inceeases or decreases as 
increase or decrease. 
swpra, 41 CaL2d 698 ; 
them 
!34 [56 P.2d 237]; English v. Brach, 
414 P.2l1 ; Aitken v. Roche, 48 Cal. 
1192 P. 464]; Klcnch v. Board Pension Fnncl 
Conus., 79 Cal.App. 171 [249 P. 46]; Ruwetscll v. Davie, 
+7 512 [190 P. 10751 ) 
to plaintiffs' contention lhe rule 
of t·onslrnction of the abovp mentioned 1ang:nage does not 
1·rt'a1e sneh an inconsisteney \Yith seet ion 24 of the J !138 ordi-
IW.IH·'\ xupm. that it mnst haYe the e!1'ed of' ov<'niding that 
The· whole onlinancle mnst be read to properly con-
'l'hns, ·while the language mentioned, standing alone, 
of, and will be given the eonstrnetion stated in 
case, section 2"1 sprcifically covrrs the situation, 
provides that pensions shall not flnctuate np 
in accordanee \Yith 11ay ftuetuat ions of aetive firemen. 
tlear, therefore, that for the period from the date of 
ret irpn;ent in the ease of plaintiffs Eielwlberger nnd \Vescott 
and i date of death in the easl' o!' Haggert.v to the effectiYr 
the 193!1 amendment of the ordinanee, said plaintiffR 
entitled to an;v increase in thrir r)ensions by reason 
of pa~~ increase for 11etiYe :Arenwn. 'l'his brings 11s, then, 
effeet of the 1D:\!J amendment and an;: pay inc·rease:.; 
effective date on the am01mt of pension to whieh plain-
entitled. 'rhe ] !1:30 amPndment remowtl th<' language 
in 24 whieh yn·eYt'nted tlle applit:ation of the rule 
ail!Hi11lWed in the Ten·~, l'HSc', and hence tmcler it. 
do as the pay of adin~ firemen is inen'asetl. Moreoyrr, 
the in1plieation of the ] !):l!) amemlmrnt is that the rnle 
in ease shall prevail lJe,·mtse it sa~·s, as the 1!1:38 
orrlinnnee (lid, that a (lrerem;e in the pay of aetiYe firemen 
shall not reduce the pension. 'l'he inference is that an illen•m;c 
]86 ErcRELm:RGER v. CrTY OF BERKEr~Ev C.2d 
in pay should increase the pension. Therefore, if the 1939 
amendment applies to plaintiffs, they are entitled to snch ill-
crease in the amount of their pensions aR will be reflected 
from any pay increase for active firemen. 
At the time of the 1939 amendment of section 24 of Ordi-
nance Number 2188-N.S., section 7 was also amended to restate 
the law as it formerly existed insofar as it is here pertinent, 
that any member of the fire department at the effective date 
of the ordinance or thereafter shall receive a pension which, 
on reaehing various ages, shall be a percentage of ''the average 
salary attaehed to the rank or ranks held during the three 
years immediately preceding the date of retirement''; the 
same is true of the death benefit provisions ( § § 11 and 13). 
The 1939 amendment to section 24 restated it as it previously 
existed with the deletion of the words above mentioned ancl 
provided that the pensions ''granted'' nnder the ordinanee 
shall not be decreased, ·which carries the implication that they 
will be increased in aecordance with the fluctuation in pay of 
active firemen. The foregoing clearly indicates that the ordi-
nance was intended to apply to existing pensioners especially 
when we bear in mind the rule that pension laws must be 
liberally construed to achieve their beneficent purposes (Terry 
v. City of Berkeley, s1tpra, 41 Cal.2d 698). In this connection 
it has been said: ''Another consideration in the matter of 
providing pensions for retired civil officers, and not the least in 
importance, is to pay such retirement compensation as will 
provide for the retired officer or employee means of proper sub-
sistence. An increase in the cost of living always justly calls 
for an increase in the compensation of those who labor to earn 
a livelihood, and this proposition obviously applies as well to 
those who labor for the public as those engaged in private 
employment, and, of course, equally so to those who, for 
reasons prescribed by law, have been retired from a public 
service to which they devoted many years of faithful adher-
ence. \Ye may add the observation that members of police and 
fire departments of a city are required as such to perform 
public duties always beset by imminent perils to their lives 
and limbs-indeed, more than any other officers or employees 
engaged in the civil department of the public service. It is, 
therefore, not at all strange but gratifying to flnd that the 
government, as in the present instance, so far as poliee officers 
are concenJPd, has bePn just enough to make sueh provision 
for the compensatio11 of such officers or employees as affords 
not only a fair reward to them Yrhile they are actively per-
.F.iiCHELBERGER v. CITY OP BERKELEY 
[46 C.2d 1R2; 293 P.2d 1] 
187 
to im:un• th<'lll, aecord. 
eouditions as to tlw eost of li\·ing, 
want or prnury after they have been compelled from 
nlated YPHI'S or from ph,vsical disabilities inwrred 
of thPir pnblie dnties to 'lay down the 
aw1 the hoe.' " (Elench v. Board of Pension Fund 
CuJili'S., supra, 79 CaLApp. 171, 189.) In Swcesy v. Los 
Retirement Board, 17 Cal.2d 356 [110 P.2d 37], 
the increase in pension benefits was expressly made 
it was also stated at page 361 : ''It must be 
as tile settled law of this state that unless the contrary 
plainly appears persons having a pensionable status 
to receive any increase of benefits which may be 
Sweesy's pension rights vested at the time he was 
from service, that is, upon the happening of the con-
upon whieh the pensionable right depended.'' In 
on other casE's the court said at page 360: ''In 
v. Board of Pension Puncl Oomrs., snpra, it was held 
that uudcr the law there involved a pensioner was entitled 
to the benefits afforded by the increases in the pay attaehed 
to tlic nmk he held at the time of his retirement, and that his 
to payment was not limited to the amount he was receiv-
ing the time of his retirement. The conclusion was based 
on f !w observation that one who has been r·egularly placed on 
the rolt is entitled to aU the benefits of the system. 
The followed Aitken v. Roche, s1tpra, wherein it was held 
that nnder the system and the charter provisions the pensioner 
\YilS afforded the benefits of subsequent inereases in the pay 
attaehed to the rank he held at the time of retirement.'' 
added.) In Brurnnwnd v. City of Oakland, 111 
CaU\pp.2d 114 [244 P.2cl 441], the fireman was an 0mployee 
aw1 member of the retirement system when the city charter 
was amended in 1943 to give a widow of a fireman who died 
\Yhilv h1 service from a nonscrviee cause $1,000 (whieh had 
been the ease I or a return of all the contributions 
the fireman, whichever the widow chose. Plaintiff's 
died in 1950 and it was held she could reeover the 
amount contributed including that contributed prior to 1943, 
tbe eourt stating at page 117: "As the section states that in 
the CTent of the death of a member under the circumstances 
therl•in set forth, his widow shall elect wh0ther to reeeive 
$1,000 or the 'refund of all such sums as have been deducted 
from his pay and contributed to' the fund, it is obvious that 
this wonlc1 include the sums paid before the amendment as 
v. CITY OF BEHKELEY r 46 C.2d 
eon tend 
, that the 
were not eontribu-
the amendment a 
of public moneys 
our case are 
~00~ ~ 
visions of any seetion but 'of all such sums as 
deduetcd' from the firemen pay and contributed 
to the fund. rrhns therr is no intention of the Legis-
laturr to limit the refunds to sums deducted at any par-
ticular time. In determining ·whether section 104(2) is to 
apply to moneys deducted after its enactment date, the 
rule set forth in Cordell v. of Los A1tgeles, 67 CaLApp. 
2d 257, 266 [ 154 P .2d 31], must be borne in mind: 'Neither 
can 1ve be unmindful of the rule so firmly established in this 
state that pension legislation must be liberally construed and 
applied to the end that the beneficent results of such legisla-
tion may be achieved. Pension provisions in our law are 
founded upon sound policy and with the objects of 
protecting, in a proper case, the pensioner and his dependents 
against economic insecurity. ln order to confer the benefits 
snch legislation should be applied fairly and 
broadly.' " In Busch v. Tunwr, 26 Cal.2d 817 [161 P.2d 
456, 171 A.L.I\.. 1063], the Legislature in 1943 amended the 
statute :fixing the salary of the district attorney stating that 
the district attorney should receive a salary of $2,400; it 
had formerly been $1,800. The court said: "The 1943 legis-
lation ·was sufficiently broad in its terms to include incum-
,' that persons holding the office ·when the amendment 
was made, and further, ''A statute purporting, in general 
terms, to increase salaries would ordinarily be construed to 
include incumbents .... '' In harmony with that line of 
reasoning it has been held that an amendment to a pension 
law which increases the amount of the pensions applies to 
those already retired. (Boar-cl of Tr-ustees of Policemen's 
Pension FundY. Sclwpp. 223 Ky. 269 [3 S.W.2d 606] ; People 
Y. Board of Truslces of Firemen's Pension F1lnd, 103 Colo. 
1 [82 P.2d 765]; McNichols v. Walton, 120 Colo. 269 [208 
P.2d 1156) ; sec Ridgley v. Board of Trustees, 371 Ill. 409 
[21 N.E.2d 286) ; Raines v. Board of Trustees, 365 Ill. 610 
189 
system is estab-
or ve~trd whm the 
clonbted that the Hl:l9 
to firemrn then in the scrYWP. ;{o 
apply to an bceause he has retired. 
If.'n\'(' ilcflla Cas. ([; lmlus!rial Ace. 30 
P .2d , is rea\l be-
t be employer's liability was fixrd 
ieh >Yns not merely an antecedent faet. 
is only antrerdent fact breanse the pension 
one and has foree from the tim<' 
Allen Y. City Beach, 
P.2d 7ELJ]), :mel the retirement does not 
' rights insofar ns the instant ease is 
32 Ca1.2d 700 ]197 P .2d 
.L.H.2d ~124], we held that an amendment to a statute 
iuterest on taxes un(1rr to the state 
to a rr<:ovrry of taxes after the effective date 
amendment even though the recoyery of interest was 
~when the taxes ·were paid, nnd distinguished the 
ou the grmmcl that the amendment operated on 
future.' en•Dts. (See 11lso Record v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 103 
CaL\ ·±:34 P.2J . ) 
relied upon by <lefenc!ant sneh as O'D!!a v. Cook, 
G59 [169 P. 366], Jordan \~. Retirement Board, ::~:J 
6:"53 [!JG P.2c1 973], Clurney Y. Los County 
59 Ca1.App.2d 413 P.2d 73;'5], 
v. City of Oakland, ,)5 Ca1.~\pp. 270 [203 P. 167], 
1J v. En11Jloyecs Retirement 71 Cnl.App.2d 
P .2cl 9:39], are (l isti11 In tlw 0 'Dea case 
was whetlwr an am<~11<1ment a time limit 
~within one year aftl•r would ent off ihe widow 
of an previously injured, who later died, and the 
co11rt felt not "<~ompelle(1" io give a rHroactive effect to the 
amendment. As was pointed 011t in Kent City of Long 
190 SIMMONS v. RHODES & JAMIESON, LTD. [46 C.2d 
Beach, 29 Cal.2d 848, 851 [179 P.2d 799], the O'Dea case 
considered the pension as vested and not subject to be taken 
away. In the Chaney case the change in the law would ad. 
versely affect the pensioner and the language indicated the 
pensioner could choose the old law or the new law. In the 
Brophy case the statute by its language was prospective and 
construed to apply to those then receiving We do 
not have language and legislative action equivalent to that 
used here iu any of the cited cases. The Jordan and Holm. 
berg cases are out of harmony with the cases hereinabove 
discussed and are disapproved. 
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed 
to enter judgment in accordance ·with the views herein ex-
pressed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,J., Traynor, J., Schauer, .J., Spence, 
.T., and McComb, ,J., concurred. 
[S. F. No. 19357. In Bank. Feb. 10, 1956.] 
GIPSON E. SIMMONS, Appellant, v. RHODES AND 
JAMIESON, LTD. (a Corporation) et al., Respondents. 
[1] Sales-Warranties-Merchantability.-"Merchantable quality" 
means that the substance sold is reasonably suitable for the 
ordinary uses it was manufactured to meet. 
[2] Id.-Warranties-Merchantability.-Where ready-mixed ce-
ment purchased to lay a concrete basement floor was fit for 
that purpose, this was the only purpose for which the test 
of merchantability could be applied. 
[3] Id.-Warranties-Cement.-A seller of ready-mixed cement 
need not warn the buyer that it will burn the skin, especially 
where the buyer knows that quicklime, which has a caustic 
effect, is one of the necessary ingredients of cement. 
[4] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application of Rule.-In an 
action by a buyer of ready-mixed cement against the seller for 
burns sustained while using the cement, the doctrine of res 
[1] See Cal.Jur., SalPs, § 66 et seq.; Am.Jur., Sales, § 341 et seq. 
[4] See Cal.Jur., ?\Pglig-ence, § 123 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, 
§ 295 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Sales,§ 131(1); [:3] Sales,§ 134.5; 
[4, 5] Negligence,§ 138; [6] Negligence,§ 135; [7] Evidence,§ 18; 
[8] Negligence, § 177. 
